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Abstract: New continuous and stochastic extensions of
the minority game, devised as a fundamental model for a mar-
ket of competitive agents, are introduced and studied in the
context of statistical physics. The new formulation repro-
duces the key features of the original model, without the need
for some of its special assumptions and, most importantly, it
demonstrates the crucial role of stochastic decision-making.
Furthermore, this formulation provides the exact but novel
non-linear equations for the dynamics of the system.
There is currently much interest in the statistical
physics of non-equilibrium frustrated and disordered
many-body systems [1]. Even relatively simple micro-
scopic dynamical equations have been shown to lead to
complex co-operative behaviour. Although several of the
interesting examples are in areas traditionally viewed as
physics, it is growingly apparent that many further chal-
lenges for statistical physics have their origins in other
fields like biology [2] and economics [3]. In this letter
we discuss a simple model whose origin lies in a market
scenario and show that not only does it exhibit inter-
esting behaviour in its own right but also it yields an
intriguingly unusual type of stochastic micro-dynamics
of potentially more general interest.
The model we will introduce is based on the the minor-
ity game (MG) [4], which is a simple and intuitive model
for the behaviour of a group of agents subject to the eco-
nomic law of supply and demand, which ensures that in
a market the profitable group of buyers or sellers of a
commodity is the minority one [5]. From the perspec-
tive of statistical physics, these problems are novel ex-
amples of frustrated and disordered many-body systems.
Agents do not interact directly but with their collective
action determine a ‘price’ which in turn affects their fu-
ture behaviour, so that minority reward implies frustra-
tion. Quenched disorder enters in that different agents
respond in different ways to the same stimuli. There
are effective random interactions between agents via the
common stimuli and the cooperative behaviour is remi-
niscent of that of spin-glasses [6], but there are important
conceptual and technical differences compared with the
problems of conventional statistical physics.
The setup of the MG in the original formulation of [4] is
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the following: N agents choose at each time step whether
to ‘buy’ (0) or ‘sell’ (1). Those agents who have made the
minority choice win, the others lose. In order to decide
what to do agents use strategies, which prescribe an ac-
tion given the set of winning outcomes in the last m time
steps. At the beginning of the game each agent draws s
strategies randomly and keep them forever. As they play,
the agents give points to all their strategies according to
their potential success in the past, and at each time step
they employ their currently most successful one (i.e. the
one with the highest number of points).
The most interesting macroscopic observable in the
MG is the fluctuation σ of the excess of buyers to sell-
ers. This quantity is equivalent to the price volatility
in a financial context and it is a measure of the global
waste of resources by the community of the agents. We
therefore want σ to be as low as possible. An important
feature of the MG, observed in simulations [7], is that
there is a regime of the parameters where σ is smaller
than the value σr which corresponds to the case where
each agent is buying or selling randomly. Previous stud-
ies have considered this feature from a geometrical and
phenomenological point of view [8]. Our aim, however,
is to enable a full analytic solution.
One of the major obstacles to an analytic study of
the MG in its original formulation is the presence of an
explicit time feedback via the memory m. Indeed, when
the information processed at each time step by the agents
is the true history, that is the result of the choices of the
agents in the m previous steps, the dynamical evolution
of the system is non-Markovian and an analytic approach
to the problem is very difficult.
A step forward in the simplification of the model has
been made in [9], where it has been shown that the ex-
plicit memory of the agents is actually irrelevant for the
global behaviour of the system: when the information
processed by the agents at each time step is just invented
randomly, having nothing to do with the true time se-
ries, the relevant macroscopic observables do not change.
The significance of this result is the following: the crucial
ingredient for the volatility to be reduced below the ran-
dom value appears to be that the agents must all react
to the same piece of information, irrespective of whether
this information is true or false [10]. This result has
an important technical consequence, since the explicit
time feedback introduced by the memory disappears: the
agents respond now to an instantaneous random piece of
information, i.e. a noise, so that the process has become
stochastic and Markovian.
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The model can be usefully simplified even further and
at the same time generalized and made more realistic.
Let us first consider the binary nature of the original
MG. It is clear that from a simulational point of view
a binary setup offers advantages of computational effi-
ciency, but unfortunately it is less ideally suited for an
analytic approach [11]. More specifically, if we are inter-
ested in the analysis of time evolution, integer variables
are usually harder to handle. Moreover, the geometrical
considerations that have been made on a hypercube of
strategies of dimension 2m for the binary setup [8], be-
come more natural and general if the strategy space is
continuous. Finally, in the original binary formulation of
the MG there is no possibility for the agents to fine tune
their bids: each agent can choose to buy or sell, but they
cannot choose by how much. As a consequence, also the
win or loss of the agents is not related to the consistency
of their bids. This is another unrealistic feature of the
model, which can be improved. For all these reasons, we
shall now introduce a continuous formulation of the MG.
Let us define a strategy ~R as a vector in the real space
R
D, subject to the constraint, ‖ ~R‖ = √D. In this way the
space of strategies Γ is just a sphere and strategies can be
thought as points on it. The next ingredient we need is
the information processed by strategies. To this aim we
introduce a random noise ~η(t), defined as a unit-length
vector in RD, which is δ-correlated in time and uniformly
distributed on the unit sphere. Finally, we define the
response b(~R) of a strategy ~R to the information ~η(t), as
the projection of the strategy on the information itself,
b(~R) ≡ ~R · ~η(t) . (1)
This response is nothing else than the bid prescribed by
the particular strategy ~R. The bid is now a continuous
quantity, which can be positive (buy) or negative (sell).
At the beginning of the game each agent draws s strate-
gies randomly from Γ, with a flat distribution. All the
strategies initially have zero points and in operation the
points are updated in a manner discussed below. At each
time step the agent uses his/her strategy with the highest
number of points. The total bid is:
A(t) ≡
N∑
i=1
bi(t) =
N∑
i=1
~R⋆i (t) · ~η(t) , (2)
where ~R⋆i (t) is the best strategy (that with the highest
number of points) of agent i at time t.
We have now to update the points. This is particularly
simple in the present continuous formulation. Let us in-
troduce a time dependent function P (~R, t) defined on Γ,
which represents the points P of strategy ~R at time t.
We can write a very simple and intuitive time evolution
equation for P ,
P (~R, t+ 1) = P (~R, t)−A(t) b(~R)/N , (3)
where A(t) is given by eq.(2). A strategy ~R is thus re-
warded (penalized) if its bid has an opposite (equal) sign
to the total bid A(t), as the supply-demand dynamics
requires. Now the win or the loss is proportional to the
bid.
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FIG. 1. Continuous formulation: The scaled variance
σ/
√
N as a function of the reduced dimension D/N , at s = 2
and s = 4. The horizontal line is the variance in the random
case. The total time t and the initial time t0 are 10000 steps.
Average over 100 samples, N = 100.
It is important to check whether the results obtained
with this continuous formulation of the MG are the same
as in the original binary model. The main observable of
interest is the variance (or volatility) σ in the fluctuation
of A, σ2 = limt→∞
1
t
∫ t0+t
t0
dt′ A(t′)2. Indeed, we shall
not consider any quantity related to individual agents.
We prefer to concentrate on the global behaviour of the
system, taking more the role of the market regulator than
that of a trading agent. The main features of the MG are
reproduced: first, we have checked that the relevant scal-
ing parameter is the reduced dimension of the strategy
space d = D/N ; second, there is a regime of d where the
variance σ is smaller than the random value σr , showing
a minimum at d = dc(s), and, moreover, the minimum of
σ(d) is shallower the higher is s [8]; see Fig.1. It can be
shown that all the other standard features of the binary
model are reproduced in the continuous formulation.
An interesting observation is that there is no need for
~η(t) to be random at all. Indeed, the only requirement
is that it must be ergodic, spanning the whole space Γ,
even in a deterministic way. Moreover, if ~η(t) visits just
a sub-space of Γ of dimension D′ < D everything in the
system proceeds as if the actual dimension was D′: the
effective dimension of the strategy space is fixed by the
dimension of the space spanned by the information.
Relations (2) and (3) constitute a closed set of equa-
tions for the dynamical evolution of P (~R, t), whose solu-
tion, once averaged over ~η and over the initial distribu-
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tion of the strategies, gives in principle an exact deter-
mination of the behaviour of the system. In practice, the
presence of the ‘best-strategy’ rule, i.e. the fact that each
agent uses the strategy with the highest points, makes
the handling of these equations still difficult. From the
perspective of statistical physics it is natural to modify
the deterministic nature of the above procedure by intro-
ducing a thermal description which progressively allows
stochastic deviations from the ‘best-strategy’ rule, as a
temperature is raised. We shall see that this generaliza-
tion is also advantageous, both for the performance of
the system in certain regimes and for the development
of convenient analytical equations for the dynamics. In
this context the ‘best-strategy’ original formulation of the
MG can be viewed as a zero temperature limit of a more
general model.
Hence we introduce the Thermal Minority Game
(TMG), defined in the following way. We allow each
agent a certain degree of stochasticity in the choice of the
strategy to use at any time step. For each agent i the
probabilities of employing his/her strategy a = 1, . . . , s
is given by,
πai (t) ≡
eβP (
~Ra
i
,t)
Zi
, Zi ≡
s∑
b=1
eβP (
~Rb
i
,t) , (4)
where P are the points, evolving with eq.(3). The in-
verse temperature β = 1/T is a measure of the power of
resolution of the agents: when β →∞ they are perfectly
able to distinguish which is their best strategy, while for
decreasing β they are more and more confused, until for
β = 0 they choose their strategy completely at random.
What we have defined is therefore a model which inter-
polates between the original ‘best-strategy’ MG (T = 0,
β = ∞) and the random case (T = ∞, β = 0). In the
language of Game Theory, when T = 0 agents play ‘pure’
strategies, while at T > 0 they play ‘mixed’ ones [12].
We now consider the consequences of having intro-
duced the temperature. Let us fix a value of d belonging
to the worse-than-random phase of the MG (see Fig.1)
and see what happens to the variance σ when we switch
on the temperature. We do know that for T = 0 we must
recover the same value as in the ordinary MG, while for
T →∞ we must obtain the value σr of the random case.
But in the middle a very interesting thing occurs: σ(T ) is
not a monotonically decreasing function of T , but there
is a large intermediate temperature regime where σ is
smaller than the random value σr. This behaviour is
shown in Fig.2.
The meaning of this result is the following: even if the
system is in a MG phase which is worse than random,
there is a way to significantly decrease the volatility σ
below the random value σr by not always using the best
strategy, but rather allowing a certain degree of individ-
ual error.
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FIG. 2. TMG: The scaled variance σ/
√
N as a function of
the temperature T , at D/N = 0.1, for s = 2. In the inset we
show σ(T )/
√
N for D/N = 0.25.
Note from Fig.2 that the temperature range where the
variance is smaller than the random one is more than two
orders of magnitude large, meaning that almost every
kind of individual stochasticity of the agents improves
the global behaviour of the system. Furthermore, as we
show in the inset of Fig.2, if we fix d at a value belonging
to the better-than-random phase, but with d < dc, a
similar range of temperature still improves the behaviour
of the system, decreasing the volatility even below the
MG value.
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FIG. 3. TMG: The scaled variance σ/
√
N as a function of
the reduced dimension D/N , at different values of the tem-
perature T = 2k × 10−2, for s = 2.
These features can be seen also in Fig.3, where we plot
σ as a function of d at various values of the temperature.
In addition this figure shows further effects: (i) the im-
provement due to thermal noise occurs only for d < dc;
(ii) there is a cross-over temperature T1 ∼ 1, below which
3
temperature has very little effect for d > dc; (iii) above
T1 the optimal dc(T ) moves continuously towards zero
and σ(dc) increases; (iv) there is a higher critical tem-
perature T2 ∼ 102 at which dc vanishes, and for T > T2
the volatility becomes monotonically increasing with d.
We turn now to a more formal description of the TMG.
Once we have introduced the probabilities πai in eq.(4) we
can write a dynamical equation for them. Indeed, from
eq.(3), after taking the continuous-time limit, we have,
π˙ai (t) = −β πai (t) a(t)
(
~Rai −
s∑
b=1
πbi (t)
~Rbi
)
· ~η(t) , (5)
where the normalized total bid a(t) is given by,
a(t) = N−1
N∑
i=1
~ri(t) · ~η(t) . (6)
Now ~ri(t) is a stochastic variable, drawn at each time
t with the time dependent probabilities set [π1i , . . . , π
s
i ].
Note the different notation: ~Rai are the quenched strate-
gies, while ~ri(t) is the particular strategy drawn at time
t from the set [~R1i , . . . ,
~Rsi ] by agent i with instantaneous
probabilities [π1i (t), . . . , π
s
i (t)]. In order to better under-
stand equation (5), we recall that bai (t) =
~Rai · ~η(t) is the
bid of strategy ~Rai at time t (eq.(1)) and therefore the
quantity wai (t) ≡ −B(t)bai (t) can be considered as the
win of this strategy (cf. eq.(3)). Hence, we can rewrite
eq. (5) in the following more intuitive form,
π˙ai (t) = β π
a
i (t) [ w
a
i (t)− 〈w〉i ] , (7)
where 〈w〉i ≡
∑s
b=1 π
b
i (t) w
b
i (t). The meaning of equa-
tion (7) is clear: the probability πai of a particular strate-
gy ~Rai increases only if the performance of that strategy
is better than the instantaneous average performance of
all the strategies belonging to the same agent i with the
same actual total bid [13].
Relations (5) and (6) are the exact dynamical equa-
tions for the TMG. They do not involve points nor mem-
ory, but just stochastic noise and quenched disorder, and
they are local in time. From the perspective of statistical
mechanics, this is satisfying and encouraging. However,
these equations differ fundamentally from conventional
replicator and Langevin dynamics. First, the Markov-
propagating variables are themselves probabilities. Sec-
ond, there are two sorts of stochastic noises, as well as
quenched randomness. Third, and more importantly, the
stochastic noises enter non-linearly, one independently
for each agent via probabilistic dependence on the π
themselves, the other globally and quadratically. They
thus provide interesting challenges for fundamental trans-
fer from microscopic to macroscopic dynamics, including
an identification of the complete set of necessary order
parameters [14]. We shall address the problem of finding
a solution of the TMG equations in a future work.
Finally, let us note that the TMG (as well as the MG)
is not only suitable for the description of market dynam-
ics. Indeed, any natural system where a population of
individuals must organize itself in order to optimize the
utilization of some limited resources, is qualitatively well
described by such a model. We hope that the thermal
model we have introduced in this Letter will give more
insight into this kind of natural phenomena.
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